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BATTLE ON THE POTOMAC
Thomas C. Hone
Wilson, George C. This War Really Matters: Inside the Fight for
Defense Dollars. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000. 239pp.
$19.95
If you plan someday to work in the Pentagon, then you need to read this book. If
you are a citizen just trying to grasp how defense budgets are made, you need to
read this book. If you are one of the so-called “policy makers” in Washington,
you also need to read this book, because it is about you and what you do.
George C. Wilson was the defense correspondent for the Washington Post for
twenty-three years. People like me looked forward to Wilson’s reports and books
because he had (and still has) a nose for war, and for the people and institutions
that make war. He also has a knack for getting to the point and for getting people
he interviews to do the same. He has certainly packed this slim book with candid
comments about the defense budget process. If you did not know why people
compare the budget process to sausage making (you can eat the product but you
don’t want to see it being made), then you will know after you have read this re-
vealing account of making the budget and approving the most recent Base Re-
alignment and Closure list.
Why did Wilson write this book? He wrote it because, as he says, few Ameri-
cans “know much about the bloodless but vital fight for their defense dollars.
This book provides a ringside seat for watching this fight up close and personal.”
Why select the 105th Congress (1997–98) to watch? The reason is that “the
105th, because it fell between the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, was less
distorted by seasonal electioneering.” Is there a bottom line to the book, a central
message? Yes. “Military leaders . . . must engage in the art of the possible to
achieve their goals.” They must master this art in order “to maximize their effec-
tiveness in government councils.”
I can hear the teeth of professional military officers
grinding. How often have I heard officers say, “I don’t
want to be a politician!” As Wilson shows, however,
the nation’s military leaders—especially the chairmen
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—have no choice in the
matter. They are intimately involved in the debate
over how to use the nation’s resources to defend the
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nation’s interests. To the degree that they bring truth, integrity, intelligence, and
tactical human skills to that debate, the nation benefits.
Yet officers are right to be wary of the political process in Washington. The
people who dominate it at the highest levels are intelligent, calculating, ambi-
tious, energetic, and committed. They are also frequently at odds with one an-
other. Getting involved with them is often like trying to mediate a fight between
two cats. Increasingly, however, most of them— whether elected or appointed,
in the executive branch or in Congress—lack military experience, so senior mili-
tary officers must contribute their professional opinions, insights, and prefer-
ences to policy and budget debates.
The value of This War Really Matters is that Wilson gets almost all the partici-
pants in the partisan political process of making the budget to speak candidly
about their views, their motives, and their tactics. The book is a classic case study
of how Washington works, and it is told largely in the words of the movers and
shakers themselves. By drawing on extensive interviews with officials in the Pen-
tagon and with members of Congress, Wilson breathes fire into what most citi-
zens regard as a confused, frustrating, and dull process. The fact that he does this
in a little more than two hundred pages of text means that readers can casually
peruse this book on an airplane or master the text in a few evenings. The author
makes reading even easier by providing chapter summaries in his introduction.
Readers short of time or interested in just one of the issues Wilson explores can
first consult these summaries; they are excellent guides.
This War Really Matters begins by considering the responses within the De-
partment of Defense and Congress to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
in 1997. Wilson focuses his attention first on John Hamre, then Pentagon comp-
troller, and his efforts to persuade the media and members of Congress that the
Clinton administration was providing enough fiscal support to the Defense De-
partment. Wilson then shifts to William Cohen, the secretary of defense. Given
what Wilson calls President Bill Clinton’s “detachment” from the QDR process,
it was up to Cohen to persuade the administration’s Republican opponents in
Congress that a “no-growth” level of defense spending was adequate to meet the
nation’s needs.
Wilson goes on to reveal the reactions of senior military officers in the Penta-
gon to the QDR and to the administration’s desire to hold defense spending
down. On one hand, the president and the leaders of the congressional majority
had agreed to spending caps for all nonentitlement programs. On the other,
both parties to the agreement felt there was a need to increase spending in cer-
tain areas. Because neither side wanted to take the blame for “busting the caps,”
both sought the support of the uniformed service chiefs. Secretary Cohen
needed them to say that they could live with a “no growth” budget. Cohen’s
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critics, such as Republican representative Floyd Spence, then chairman of the
House National Security Committee, wanted the service chiefs to declare that
they could not carry out their legal responsibilities without additional funding.
The chiefs were in the middle. Wilson interviewed a number of senior officers
for this book, including Army general John Shalikashvili, and his deputy for the
QDR, Air Force general Ronald Fogleman. These interviews make fascinating
reading. They reveal strong but honest differences among uniformed service
leaders about the roles their forces should play in the future. If one purpose of
the QDR was to force service leaders to resolve those differences, these inter-
views show that it failed. The interviews also show how sensitive the officers
were to competition among the services, and how often they found it hard to get
people without military backgrounds to understand the special problems faced
by military forces entrusted with worldwide missions.
The chiefs supported Secretary Cohen when the QDR was issued in the spring
of 1997 and again in testimony to Congress in February 1998. Yet the escalating
political conflict between the Republican majority in Congress and the White
House kept both houses of Congress from passing a joint budget resolution for
fiscal year 1999. This turned out to be an opportunity for the service chiefs to go
after the additional funding that they had foresworn the previous year.
In the run-up to the 1998 congressional elections, neither political party
wanted to be tagged as “obstructionist.” However, neither party was happy just
to continue the budget “caps” agreed to in 1997. In early September 1998, for ex-
ample, President Clinton met with the service chiefs and told them to take their
cases for more funding to Congress. When the chiefs testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee at the end of September, they took a coordinated
and prepared position. Wilson calls it “smart politics.” The trick was to get the
Republicans in Congress to take the responsibility for “breaking the caps.” The
Republicans understood the game and tried to place the onus on the White
House. Wilson’s description of the resulting political maneuvering is fascinating.
There is a lot more to this book as well. For example, Wilson persuaded both
Representative David Obey, then the ranking Democrat on the House Appropri-
ations Committee, and Republican Robert Livingston, then the committee’s
chairman, to speak candidly about the budget process. Obey’s views are particu-
larly interesting. Obey claims that the budget process institutionalized in 1974
had failed, and that there was an urgent need for structural reform. Livingston
does not agree, but the comments of both representatives merit consideration.
There are more gems, including the travail of F. Whitten Peters, appointed
Under Secretary of the Air Force in November 1997. In the dispute between
President Clinton and members of Congress over the base realignment report
submitted in 1995, Peters was caught in a partisan political battle that also
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included major defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin. A memo Peters
wrote at the end of April 1998 to John Hamre, then deputy secretary of defense,
describing a way to preserve jobs at a major Air Force depot on the “cut” list, was
soon leaked to House Republicans. Peters, trying to find a solution to the dispute
that was acceptable to all parties, was soon pilloried by all sides. Yet he managed
what Wilson calls “a remarkable turnaround. He converted his former critics
into supporters” and may well have saved the process itself.
The scandal over the president’s conduct with White House intern Monica
Lewinsky dominated political news in 1998. As George Wilson shows, however,
the debates and political maneuvers that affected the fiscal year 1999 defense
budget were just as dramatic, if far less visible in the media.
This book is the best introduction in print to the defense budget process. It is
also a wonderfully revealing examination of how influential people in the Penta-
gon and Congress think about their jobs and their constitutional responsibilities.
This War Really Matters has only two weaknesses. The first is that Wilson did
not interview President Clinton. As a result, the president’s views in the book are
those he gave publicly to the media, or those that could be gleaned secondhand
from others whom Wilson interviewed. The second weakness is that it lacks a
chronology. The book contains a glossary and a host of useful charts in an ap-
pendix, but a chronology would have helped readers—especially if it tracked the
Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment of the president in parallel with the
progress of the fiscal year 1999 budget.
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